

## Letters . . .

### ROTATING ASHORE

**To the Editor**—In “A Word from the Chairman” (*JFQ*, Winter 95–96), GEN Shalikhvili dealt mainly with what should and should not be done with defense spending. While I agree with most of his points on base realignment, acquisition reform, and base closures, I disagree with the notion of privatizing and outsourcing at shore-based commands. Shore duty is typically viewed by those of us who serve in the Navy as a break between sea duty assignments. But when civilians replace sailors in these commands you cut the number of billets available for shore duty. Most sailors look forward to rotating ashore, regarding such assignments as incentives for the time that they spend at sea. Taking that away is demoralizing. I also find it wasteful to hire civilians for jobs that sailors can do just as well and at less cost. Sailors already collect a paycheck. Why not capitalize on that?

—STG2 (SW) Michael V. Chiazza, USN  
Master at Arms Division  
Naval Education and Training Center

### ENGAGEMENT FORCES

**To the Editor**—In “New Forces for Engagement Policy” (*JFQ*, Winter 95–96), William Mendel made an excellent case for organizing a joint engagement command (JEC) to tackle operations other than war (OOTW). He recommended a functional, CONUS-based standing joint task force (JTF) for worldwide use. Another way to meet this challenge is with regional policy and forces. OOTW missions are often regional versus functional, with solutions peculiar to a CINC’s AOR.

Standing JTFs in peacetime are few and normally reserved for special missions. However, some theater exercise programs train regionally apportioned forces for missions, including OOTW, predicted for their AOR. Predesignated headquarters within the PACOM AOR (namely, I Corps, III MEF, Seventh Fleet) are trained as JTF commanders under CINCPAC. Joint forces are trained and routinely employed in PACOM, gaining valuable experience at all levels.

CINCPAC developed a decision process for selecting the best suited JTF commander for a particular mission based on various factors, some of which are hard to forecast prior to the event. A deployable augmentation cell from the CINCPAC staff and components, routinely exercised, is sent to a JTF commander and assures that it has the joint expertise to accomplish the mission.

A new CONUS-based organization which neither routinely works in the theater nor trains with

theater forces may be unnecessary—and less effective. The current policy whereby regional CINCs source components to form JTFs/JECs when needed works.

—LTC Chris North, USA  
EUSA Battlefield Coordination  
Detachment, Korea

### OR A JOINT CPO?

**To the Editor**—While serving as command master chief for Naval Special Warfare Group Two, I recommended *JFQ* to my chiefs’ mess for awareness of a joint perspective in executing our tasks. For that reason I read the letter from SGM Traeger (“A Joint NCO?” *JFQ*, Autumn 95) with great interest. It hit home since much if not all of the focus on jointness involves matters of operational planning and execution. Personnel items—morale, welfare, personal recognition, education, and training—are largely ignored.

Simple nuisances in the context of one service culture can become significant obstacles for the soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen who serve in joint billets or participate in joint exercises. This might involve disparities along service lines among members of a “joint team” when it comes to per diem rates or awards recommendations.

Dealing with such challenges is not uncommon for senior enlisted personnel who daily face education, PERSTEMPO, and retention problems. Such issues do not go away in the joint world; they become more complex. Though Traeger touched on “the friction at the seams of joint training and operations,” he might have asked: How well are we managing the intricate relationships among the members of different services with their unique cultures and how well are they working, living, learning, and executing together? The answer today is “okay, but.” That is unacceptable. We can do better. I support the sergeant major’s recommendation. The Chairman should have a senior NCO or CPO on his joint leadership team.

—GMCM Brian L. Berrey, USN (Ret.)  
Waldorf, Maryland

### SORRY MEIN HERR

**To the Editor**—Carl von Clausewitz’s middle name is Philipp Gottlieb, not Maria as shown in the caption under his likeness which accompanied my article (*JFQ*, Winter 95–96). For the record, Maria was his wife’s name. This confusion has been very pervasive. Even Sir Michael Howard admits having gotten it wrong as did reference works like the *Harper Encyclopedia of Military Biography*.

—MAJ Antulio J. Echevarria II, USA  
Chief, Battalion/Brigade Doctrine  
3/16 Cavalry

### THE LAST WORD

**To the Editor**—The two letters from John Ray Skates and Barton J. Bernstein in your last issue, which appeared in response to my article, “Operation Downfall: The Devil Was in the Details” (see *JFQ*, Autumn 95), prompt me to make one final effort to make my case.

The assertion by Professor Skates that he was only attempting “to determine the casualties that were projected by the military planners” contradicts statements in the preface, summation, and subtitle of his book. Moreover, the remarkably low number of casualties which he projected from *larger* estimates in contemporaneous military sources is central to his thesis that a ground invasion would not have been so bad after all: a contention that he now seems to hope readers will not notice.

While Skates had access to much of the available evidence, he seems to understand little of it. As a result, his book reveals innumerable misconceptions which directly or indirectly support his claim that casualties would have been comparatively low and that using the atomic bomb was unnecessary. These include an overly literal interpretation of what the Japanese meant by *beach* defenses, misreading the increasing effectiveness of enemy anti-tank doctrine, and failing to realize that weak centralized control of Japanese artillery was irrelevant when firing from dug-in, camouflaged positions on pre-ranged, congested landing sites and avenues of approach. Also, he seriously mishandles the question of the Kamikazes.

I am delighted, however, that Professor Bernstein found my criticism of the Skates book “spirited,” but unfortunately he and I differ on the historical record. Regarding President Truman’s letter to Air Force historian James Cate, though Truman bypassed his staff more frequently than any other chief executive in this century, it was not unusual for him to allow his staff read and comment on hastily penned communications. In the original draft of the Cate letter, Truman recounted only the “minimum” number of expected casualties that George Marshall gave him—which happened to be 250,000 men—and made no reference to a maximum. Secretary Stimson, however, had publicly cited a maximum, stating that he was advised that the figures “might” exceed one million.

Presidential aids Ken Heckler and David Lloyd thought that providing both maximum and minimums figure was crucial, and among other things, raised the Stimson account. That Truman was reminded by these two young staffers—who had not attended any meeting with Marshall—is not, as

Bernstein proposes, something that proves or disproves what the President discussed with Marshall in private. Neither does it alter the fact that Truman personally approved the addition to his letter, which credited Marshall as the source, and used these figures and attribution in his memoirs as well.

As for Bernstein's contention that "Stimson's own published postwar claim is unsupported by reliable pre-Hiroshima sources that any scholar has unearthed," perhaps he should consult *Truman and the Hiroshima Cult* by Robert P. Newman. It seems that during this period of intense scrutiny of the casualty issue and the wider implications of dropping the bomb, the Secretary of War's own staff reported a figure of 1,000,000 which meets Bernstein's search for a pre-Hiroshima source.

It is also important that Marshall never refuted Truman's statement, even obliquely. What he said was that an invasion would have been "terribly bitter and frightfully expensive in lives and treasure." He also stated that claims the war would have ended soon, even without using atomic weapons "were rather silly," maintaining that "it was quite necessary to drop the bomb to shorten the war," going on to add that "I think it was very wise to use it."

—D.M. Giangreco

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## A MATTER OF HONOR

**To the Editor**—As the Army reengineers its doctrine on leadership, one underlying objective is to adopt a set of values. In his article on "Leadership, Community, and Virtue" (*JFQ*, Spring 96), James Toner provides a timely impetus for considering candidate values. And yet I was troubled by the structure of his argument with its mantra that "the highest virtue of a soldier . . . is honor." The problem, as he rightly indicates, is that honor can

be easily distorted and turned into a shield for disgracefully selfish conduct. What seems odd is that Toner clearly points to the superiority of integrity over all other virtues. To me, integrity is the fullest expression of those essential qualities that make up a person of character.

Integrity is the virtue of honor selflessly applied and devotion to professional competence. It goes beyond wisdom and good judgment because it brings forth right action which, in turn, is the very heart of duty. Whatever one thinks of Robert E. Lee's personal behavior, his statement that "Duty is the sublimest word in the English language," reflects a soldier's traditional grasp of that concept as it existed prior to World War II.

One facet of duty is perhaps rather stiffly, albeit well captured in Worth's battalion orders issued at West Point in 1820: ". . . an officer on duty knows no one. To be partial is to dishonor both himself and the object of his ill-advised favor." Here integrity of person and the fulfillment of lawful orders are united to transcend mere honor. Honorable conduct is fundamental to integrity, but honor has a distinctly personal quality, so much so that, without an admixture of selflessness, it is easily distorted. Integrity, as Toner ably, if indirectly notes, is a better basis for conduct.

—Douglas V. Johnson II

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## NONLINEAR WORLD

**To the Editor**—Having read arguments on the disestablishment of a separate Air Force in the pages of *JFQ* and elsewhere, I find many of them, though valid, are linear and reductionist. Protagonists assume that adding enough details—on roles, missions, capabilities, et al.—will carry the day. The Air Force will then survive or be eliminated.

The modern world is enormously complex and it is also nonlinear. International security is at least that complex, and since the demise of the

bipolar Cold War it is becoming more so. Linear, reductionist argumentation can neither adequately describe nor prescribe such a world. Those who disagree over the continued existence of the Air Force in such an environment should consider the nature of both the defense establishment and the external world in which it exists and must interact. Let me to cite two illustrations, one negative and one positive.

On the negative side, there is the field of "cutback management" that addresses reducing or eliminating organizational structure. Unfortunately, administrators and policymakers who initiate this process often fail to take into account the complexity and nonlinearity found in the real world. The result is that in attempting to "unbuild" a major organization such as the Air Force one finds that things do not tend to come apart in the same way they were put together.

On the positive side, the simple existence of a separate Air Force can yield real benefits in the complex world of international security. Thus in coping with complex environments (such as foreign affairs), the regulating system (or security structure) must be similarly complex. Structural complexity of human systems can be enhanced by a variety of people, viewpoints, and experiences (educational and operational). One can't assume that complexity is enhanced just by the existence of many entities within a larger structure. That is, the existence of a navy and marine corps in one compartment, an army in another, and an air force in yet another doesn't in itself add to complexity in a defense establishment. Linear addition does not enhance complexity. Elements must be linked both horizontally and vertically. Individual services must be made to interact and perform jointly.

There are several bottom lines. First, a separate Department of the Air Force has existed for half a century. Much of the defense establishment today is predicated on that fact. Any effort to disestablish the Air Force may not be as clearly delineated as some might believe. Second, any attempt to do so may have major unforeseen consequences. Sadly, in the nonlinear world events are generally not reversible. Thus we may create an "oops" that cannot be undone. Third, though messy and perhaps duplicative, the existing defense establishment may by its complexity be more survivable and adaptive to real world events.

—Maj Francis X. Neumann, Jr.,

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*put your pen to paper . . .*

**JFQ**

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